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Sexual Harassment Litigation with a Dose of 
Reality 
Diane P. Wood† 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 which prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”2 has 
been around for 55 years. One might think that this was long enough to 
work out the kinks and ensure that its protections are readily available 
to any covered person who needs them. But at least parts of the statute 
are still works-in-progress. Prominent among the latter group is the 
prohibition against “discriminat[ion] against any individual with re-
spect to his [sic] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”3 There is much one 
could say about this, starting with the question “what does the word 
‘sex’ mean here?”4 But that topic, important though it is, deserves its 
own Symposium.5 The focus of today’s discussion is the #MeToo Move-
ment. If there is any message to be taken from the explosive growth of 
that hashtag, it is that there is still a great deal of work to be done if 
the goal is to eliminate sexual harassment and related abusive behav-
iors. 
Why is that? As I just said, statutory protections against sex dis-
crimination in the workplace have existed for more than half a century, 
 
 †  Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, The 
University of Chicago. I wish to thank Adam Davidson, Andrew Miller, and Elizabeth Reese for 
their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article. 
 1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012). 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 3 Id. 
 4 See Hively v. Ivy Tech Comm. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 340 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(construing the word “sex” to encompass classifications based on sexual orientation); Whitaker v. 
Kenosha Unified Schl. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Title 
IX protections to transgender high school student on sex-stereotyping theory). 
6 See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 121 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (agreeing with 
Hively); Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2019) (disagreeing with Hively). 
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and there are comparable protections in other specialized settings, in-
cluding housing,6 educational institutions,7 and public benefits.8 The 
flood of stories that has emerged in the wake of the #MeToo Movement, 
however, strongly indicates that those legal rules are not doing the job. 
The question is why not? And in particular, why have the laws address-
ing #MeToo in the workplace not been a match for the problem? This 
inquiry sheds light both on changes that may be especially useful, and 
on the competing interests that will have to be addressed. 
Let’s start with the basics: what does discrimination on the basis 
of sex mean? Does it mean classifying one’s employees by biological gen-
der and paying the males more money? Certainly yes, but that isn’t all 
it means. Does it mean excluding one sex on the basis of characteristics 
unique to it—pregnancy for women, susceptibility to prostate cancer for 
men, and so on? This is a more difficult question in some instances, but 
Congress has answered it in others. For example, the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 19789 clarifies that the terms “because of sex” or “on 
the basis of sex” include actions taken on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions.10 For issues covered by that stat-
ute, at least, the answer to the second question is also yes. But what 
about sexual harassment? 
For more than two decades after Title VII was enacted, it seems 
fair to say that very few people imagined that the statute addressed 
sexual harassment. Some, however, realized that few things affect a 
person’s “terms and conditions of employment” more than sexual har-
assment. In 1979, Catharine MacKinnon published her groundbreaking 
book entitled simply “Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case 
of Sex Discrimination.”11 The book revolutionized thinking in this area. 
In what must be record time for a legal scholar, MacKinnon’s concept 
made its way up to the Supreme Court in 1986, in a case called Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.12 There, in an opinion by then-Associate 
 
 6 Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et 
seq.). 
 7 Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.). 
 8 See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (finding that gender-based discrim-
ination in the criteria for awarding social security survivor benefits violated the Constitution’s due 
process and equal protection guarantees); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642–44 (1975) 
(striking down as unlawful sex discrimination in violation of equal protection a provision basing 
social security benefits based only on the earnings of a deceased husband, and not on earnings of 
a deceased wife). 
 9 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-(k)). 
 10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 11 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION (1979). 
 12 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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Justice William Rehnquist, the Court recognized that sexual harass-
ment is covered by Title VII. In so doing, it settled several important 
questions: 
 When a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because 
of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor discriminates on 
the basis of sex.13 
 The language of Title VII is not limited to economic or tan-
gible discrimination. The phrase “terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of employment” evinces a congressional intent to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men 
and women in employment.14 
 Sexual misconduct constitutes prohibited sexual harass-
ment, whether or not it is directly linked to the grant or de-
nial of an economic quid pro quo, where such conduct has 
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an in-
dividual’s work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment.15 
 A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving 
that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or 
abusive work environment.16 
 For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim’s employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.17 
 The fact that sex-related conduct is “voluntary,” in the sense 
that the complainant has not been forced to participate 
against her will, is not a defense to a sexual-harassment suit 
brought under Title VII. The gravamen of any sexual har-
assment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were “un-
welcome.”18 
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed these rulings over the years. In 
1993, in the case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,19 it held that har-
 
 13 Id. at 64. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 65. 
 16 Id. at 66. 
 17 Id. at 67. 
 18 Id. at 68. 
 19 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (former employee brought suit against her employer, arguing the com-
pany president’s gender-based insults and innuendos created an abusive work environment. While 
the lower court held that the comments were not so severe as to affect her psychological well-being 
nor to cause her injury, the Supreme Court ultimately held “when the workplace is permeated 
with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
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assment need not reach the level of tangible psychological injury in or-
der to be actionable.20 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,21 
it recognized that harassment at the hands of a person of the same sex 
as the victim falls within the statute.22 In the twin cases of Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth23 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,24 it set 
forth the rules for linking a supervisor or other actor’s conduct to the 
employer; those rules in turn establish when the employer will be vicar-
iously liable for misconduct. It is worth stressing in this connection that 
the link to the ultimate employer is critical—indeed, it is outcome-de-
terminative for purposes of a Title VII action. Courts have held that 
Title VII creates a remedy only against the “employer.”25 From that, 
they infer that the offender, whether a supervisor, a fellow employee, a 
customer, or another workplace participant, is not individually liable 
under the statute.26 Unless, therefore, a state-law theory exists, or an-
other federal statute is available (often true in racial discrimination and 
harassment cases),27 the plaintiff can proceed only indirectly against 
the offending party, by pursuing an action against the employer. 
The need to link the offending behavior to the employer is thus one 
of the hurdles that a victim of sexual harassment must surmount. But 
it is far from the only one. Most cases do not make it all the way up to 
the Supreme Court, and the Court chooses only those in which a broader 
point needs to be made. It is the district courts and the courts of appeals 
that have the responsibility of sifting through the filed cases and decid-
ing at retail who wins and who loses. At that level, it becomes apparent 
that even blatant cases of sexual harassment frequently fail. 
 
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’ Title 
VII is violated”). 
 20 Id. at 21–22. 
 21 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (the male plaintiff quit and brought a sexual harassment claim against 
his employer after male crewmen on the oil rig where he worked subjected him to sexual humilia-
tion, sexual assault, and threats of rape). 
 22 Id. at 81–82. 
 23 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that an employer is vicariously liable for harassment per-
petrated by an employee with higher authority over the victim, and noting that this liability is 
strict if there are tangible job consequences, but if there are no tangible job consequences, the 
employer may avail itself of an affirmative defense, which requires a showing that the employer 
exercised reasonable care to “prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” and 
that the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportu-
nities provided”). 
 24 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (holding that, in cases not involving a tangible employment action, 
an employer may raise an affirmative defense that “looks to the reasonableness of employer’s con-
duct in seeking to prevent and correct harassing conduct and to the reasonableness of employee’s 
conduct in seeking to avoid harm”). 
 25 See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995); Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 
557 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). 
395] SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION 399 
This paper looks at those cases and asks what went wrong and 
whether changes in the law are necessary, or if on the other hand the 
plaintiffs’ failures occur as a result of competing policies. Importantly, 
because more than 98% of all civil litigation is resolved short of a trial, 
the facts in the cases discussed here are generally not contested: at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepts the facts and inferences in 
favor of the opponent of the motion;28 at the summary judgment stage, 
the court reviews the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff (or more accurately, the non-moving party, as plaintiff nor-
mally is in an employment-discrimination case).29 Yet even with this 
thumb on the scale, plaintiffs lose an impressive percentage of cases. 
Sometimes they lose because the court concludes that the described con-
duct is not severe enough, or not pervasive enough, to affect the terms 
and conditions of employment.30 Sometimes, based on the same notion, 
courts actually overturn jury verdicts for plaintiffs.31 In other instances, 
plaintiffs lose because they do not adequately inform the employer of 
the abuse that is going on.32 In another line of cases, the court does not 
see the connection between the harassing acts and the plaintiff’s sex.33 
Plaintiffs lose notwithstanding facts that strongly suggest harassment, 
if they make a mistake and choose the wrong legal theory—for example, 
if they complain to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
about sex discrimination, but the facts are later judged to be a better fit 
for unlawful retaliation.34 In one egregious instance described below, 
the EEOC took over a complaint and secured a victory on liability, but 
the battle then shifted to punitive damages. A jury thought that these 
damages were appropriate, but the court of appeals overturned the 
 
 28 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“When there are well-pleaded factual 
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give 
rise to an entitlement to relief.”); Acosta v. Jani-King of Okla., Inc., 905 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 
2018); Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 29 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986); Hutchison v. Fitzgerald Equip. Co., 910 F.3d 1016, 1021–22 
(7th Cir. 2018). 
 30 See, e.g., Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993) (upper thigh rub-
bing, unwanted kissing, leaping out from behind bush); Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 
456, 463–64 (7th Cir. 2002) (leering, touching); Bilal v. Rotec Indus., 326 Fed. App’x 949, 952–53 
(7th Cir. 2009) (inviting sex, sticking chocolate into plaintiff’s mouth). But see Hostetler v. Quality 
Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000) (overturning a district court that dismissed a case 
on the ground that the conduct was not sufficiently severe). 
 31 See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 432–33 (7th Cir. 1995) (overturning 
a district court ruling in favor of the plaintiff on the grounds that the plaintiff’s alleged harasser 
neither touch her nor asked her to go on a date or have sex with him). 
 32 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 96 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1996); Perry 
v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1014–15 (7th Cir. 1997); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 782–83 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 748–49 (1998). 
 33 See Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 810–11 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 34 See, e.g., id. at 809–10. 
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jury’s verdict because it found that the instructions did not give the jury 
enough latitude to take into account the relevant collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Other problems lie behind these observable results. As the law has 
developed, in all but a small number of cases nothing can or will happen 
unless the victim reports the abuse or harassment in a timely and com-
plete manner. But reporting is often difficult, both psychologically and 
practically. Reporting mechanisms and confidentiality measures are 
notoriously leaky. Victims fear either ineffectual responses or retalia-
tion. Victims also fear, with some warrant, that they will not be believed 
or that the seriousness of the problem will not be appreciated. In those 
instances, the victim might wind up as the party paying a price for the 
offensive conduct, through a transfer to a less desirable location, a move 
to a different job, or in the most extreme cases, even dismissal. Investi-
gations of complaints may be cursory, and their results may rest on 
credibility determinations that are themselves questionable. 
To address these and related problems, changes in the law may be 
necessary. One area ripe for re-examination is the distinction the Su-
preme Court has recognized between supervisory harassment and fel-
low-employee or customer harassment. Another area where greater 
scrutiny would help is that of preventive measures and remedies. It is, 
or at least should be, shocking that 80% of women report that they have 
experienced sexual harassment, and many men have also been victim-
ized. That must stop. 
A closer look at some cases in this area will drive these points home. 
The specific examples presented here come from the Seventh Circuit; in 
addition, I discuss the preliminary results of a broader survey of the 
cases that have reached the federal courts of appeals since Meritor.35 
One might view the Seventh Circuit examples as the legal version of 
the popular TV show “Mythbusters.” In the spirit of that show, these 
cases debunk the idea that companies and individuals are routinely 
found liable for sexual harassment based on innocuous or misunder-
stood behavior (e.g., “you look nice today,” or “let me hold the door for 
you”). The reality is otherwise: the innocuous actions never get liti-
gated, or if they do, they are quickly thrown out of court, while even 
truly awful actions frequently fall outside the scope of the law as a re-
sult of one or more of the doctrines mentioned earlier. It is worth con-
sidering whether those doctrines are performing a valuable function, or 
if they need to be modified or jettisoned altogether. 
The Seventh Circuit cases almost all involve behavior described by 
the victim of harassment—and accepted by the court because the appeal 
 
 35 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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is from a motion to dismiss or the grant of summary judgment—that 
was not enough to allow the victim to go forward with her case. For 
want of a better organizational mechanism, they are presented in 
chronological order. 
The first example is the case of Saxton v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.36 Plaintiff Saxton began working for AT&T’s Design En-
gineering Staff in 1986.37 Shortly after she joined the company, she en-
countered a supervisor in the International Division named Jerome 
Richardson.38 The two struck up a casual acquaintance and discussed 
the question whether Saxton might transfer to Richardson’s group.39 
Richardson boasted that he could bring Saxton into his group with a job 
classification (called MTS) that typically required a bachelor of science 
degree in engineering or a related field from a reputable university, 
even though Saxton had only a bachelor of arts degree in computer sci-
ence from a lesser-known college.40 Saxton’s supervisor told her that the 
supervisor doubted that Saxton could be transferred into the MTS job.41 
Saxton, however, decided to give the transfer a try; she accepted Rich-
ardson’s offer and joined his group in January 1988.42 The former su-
pervisor’s qualms were vindicated when, in February or March, Rich-
ardson informed Saxton that she actually did not have the MTS job, but 
instead had a lower classification.43 Richardson assured her that the 
opportunity for the promotion was still available, if she performed sat-
isfactorily. As far as the record shows, however, “she never received the 
MTS promotion.”44 
Then matters took a disturbing turn. In April 1988, Richardson 
suggested that Saxton and he should meet for drinks after work.45 Sax-
ton accepted, hoping to discuss her dissatisfaction with her initial lab 
assignment.46 The two spent a couple of hours at a suburban nightclub 
and then drove to a jazz club in Chicago.47 As the court’s opinion re-
counts, “[w]hile they were at the jazz club, Richardson placed his hand 
on Saxton’s leg above the knee several times and once he rubbed his 
 
 36 10 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 37 Id. at 528. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel.Co., 10 F.3d 526, 528 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
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hand along her upper thigh.”48 Saxton rebuffed his advances and asked 
him to stop. She warned him that this behavior could lead to trouble.49 
Richardson, however, was not deterred: on the way out of the club, he 
pulled Saxton aside and kissed her. She pushed him away after two or 
three seconds.50 Once again, Saxton asked him not to repeat his ad-
vances, and he seemingly acquiesced.51 The next morning at work, Sax-
ton reiterated her request that he cease the sexual advances. At the 
time, Richardson apologized and assured her that he would respect her 
wishes.52 
Richardson did not keep his word, as one can see from the court’s 
account of the case: 
Approximately three weeks later, Richardson invited Saxton to 
lunch with the stated purpose of discussing work-related mat-
ters. Afterwards, Richardson was driving Saxton back to her car 
when he took a detour to an arboretum, stopped the car, and got 
out to take a walk. Saxton decided to follow suit and walk off on 
her own. As she did so, Richardson suddenly “lurched” at her 
from behind some bushes, as if to grab her. Saxton ran several 
feet in order to avoid Richardson’s sudden motion. She again re-
minded Richardson that his conduct was inappropriate, causing 
him to become sullen. They then resumed the drive back to Sax-
ton’s car without further incident.53 
After the arboretum incident, Richardson ceased any sexual ad-
vances toward Saxton.54 Saxton then sued for sexual harassment, but 
her case was dismissed. Here is the court’s explanation for its result: 
“Although Richardson’s conduct was undoubtedly inappropriate, it was 
not so severe or pervasive as to create an objectively hostile working 
environment.”55 In addition, the court said, AT&T took adequate reme-
dial steps.56 
Example number two is Baskerville v. Culligan International Co.57 
This result was, if possible, even less favorable to the claimant, in whose 
 
 48 Id. at 528. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 529. 
 55 Id. at 534. 
 56 Id. at 535–36. 
 57 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 916 
F.3d 631, 640 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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favor a jury had ruled at the trial level, but who lost in the court of 
appeals.58 Baskerville was hired as a secretary in the marketing depart-
ment of Culligan, a manufacturer of water-treatment products.59 
Shortly after she joined the company, she was assigned to work for Mi-
chael Hall, who had recently been hired to be the Western Regional 
Manager.60 Here are the acts of sexual harassment about which Bas-
kerville was complaining, some of which may seem trivial, others more 
serious: 
 He would call her “pretty girl.” 
 When she was wearing a leather skirt, he made an obnox-
ious sound as she was leaving his office. 
 In response to her comment about how hot his office was, he 
raised his eyebrows and said, “Not until you stepped your 
foot in here.” 
 When the company was broadcasting an announcement 
over the public address system, Hall said to Baskerville, 
“You know what that means, don’t you? All pretty girls run 
around naked.”61 
 He once called Baskerville a “tilly,” a term that he admitted 
using for all women. 
 He told her that his wife had said that he had “better clean 
up [his] act” and “better think of [Baskerville] as Ms. Anita 
Hill.” 
 He told Baskerville that he left a Christmas party early be-
cause he thought he might “lose control” with “so many 
pretty girls there.”62 
 When she complained about cigarette smoke in Hall’s office, 
he replied “Oh really? Were we dancing, like in a night-
club?”63 
 When Baskerville checked to see if Hall had sent his wife a 
Valentine’s Day card, he responded that he had not. He con-
tinued by saying that it was lonely in his hotel room, where 
he lived alone while awaiting his wife’s move to Chicago, 
and he had nothing but his pillow for company. At that 
point, he made a gesture intended to suggest masturba-
tion.64 
 
 58 Id. at 430. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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Using a standard that the courts have since rejected, under which 
actionable harassment occurs only if the workplace becomes “hellish” 
for the victim,65 the court of appeals found as a matter of law that no 
jury could conclude that these incidents added up to harassment.66 In 
addition, as in Saxton, the court was impressed that the company took 
some steps to protect the victim.67 Although one might think that the 
later disapproval of the “hellish” standard is a step forward, we will see 
that later cases confirm that it is still necessary to show both subjective 
and objective offensiveness, and that the latter must be enough to affect 
terms and conditions of employment. 
The facts of the next example, Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff’s 
Department,68 are more graphic. Michelle Zimmerman was employed as 
a correctional officer by the Cook County Sheriff’s Department.69 In Au-
gust of 1992 a fellow officer, Salvatore Terranova, launched a campaign 
of inappropriate sexual remarks and behavior.70 For example, he re-
peatedly referred to his “big dick.”71 His worst act, however, took place 
on August 14, “when he placed a zucchini between his legs and thrust 
it against [Zimmerman]’s buttocks.”72 Three days later, she asked her 
supervisor for a change in work assignment. She did not tie her request 
directly to Terranova’s offensive sexual conduct; she complained only of 
“a severe personality conflict at my present job.”73 Her supervisor 
turned her down the next day without conducting any investigation.74 
After a brief time during which the Sheriff’s Office separated the two, 
Zimmerman was reassigned to Terranova’s area.75 He picked up where 
he had left off.76 This time, his behavior was even more offensive: the 
opinion reports that on one occasion, “he grabbed one of her breasts, 
 
 65 For instance, in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the Supreme Court con-
firmed that “Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.” 
Id. at 22. It continued, “[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not 
seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job 
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing their 
careers.” Id. See also Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp., 911 F.3d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 2018) (“While ‘hellish’ 
was once the standard, it is no longer. The Supreme Court standard dictates that the discrimina-
tion just be only so severe or pervasive so as to affect the terms and conditions of employment. . . . 
This is a far cry from hellish.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 66 Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 67 Id. 
 68 96 F.3d 1017 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 69 Id. at 1018. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
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grabbed and rubbed her buttocks, and grabbed her by her wrists and 
yanked her arms down, injuring one of her arms.”77 The next day, she 
submitted detailed memoranda concerning these incidents to her supe-
riors.78 During their investigation, which exonerated Terranova, they 
separated the two.79 Shortly afterward she went on disability leave and 
did not return to her job for a year.80 The one-year hiatus apparently 
resolved her remaining workplace problems with Terranova, with 
whom she had no further contact on the job.81 She did not, however, 
acquiesce in his behavior. To the contrary, she filed criminal charges 
against Terranova. Interestingly, even though he had been exonerated 
by the Sheriff’s Department, he was convicted of sexual assault.82 Nev-
ertheless, Zimmerman lost her civil sexual harassment action.83 The 
problem this time? Insufficient notice to the employer of the nature of 
the problem she had with Terranova.84 
The case of Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc.,85 also failed for lack of 
adequate notice to the employer.86 This was an example of less intru-
sive, but persistent, inappropriate remarks. For instance, about six 
months into plaintiff Perry’s employment, Jackson commented to her, 
“You know you want me, don’t you?”87 It did not take long for Jackson 
to escalate his advances. He called Perry to his office a couple of months 
later on the pretext of discussing her performance.88 And that is how 
the conversation began: Jackson commented on Perry’s absenteeism. 
But he then said, “By the way, [in] your interview, I saw your breasts. 
I saw your nipples . . . . You wore a low-cut blouse, and I could see your 
breasts, and I knew your nipples were hard.”89 On another occasion, 
Jackson told Perry that he would “beat [her] with the stick [her] hus-
band used.”90 She understood him to be referring to his penis and his 
desire to have sex with her.91 Other inappropriate remarks followed, 
including comments about her waking up next to him in bed, about 
whether she was a “screamer,” and the observation that she “wore her 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 1019. 
 85 126 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997). 
          92   Id. at 1011. 
 87 Id. at 1011–12. 
 88 Id. at 1012. 
          95    Id. 
          96    Id. 
 91 Id. 
406 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2019 
clothes well.”92 Perry’s effort to sue was blocked by two facts: she never 
reported any of these comments to anyone at Chernin’s; and Chernin’s 
had published policies against sexual harassment in the workplace.93 
Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc.,94 the next example, shows that 
plaintiffs occasionally win. Although the district court had granted 
summary judgment for the employer, the Seventh Circuit reversed and 
remanded to allow the case to go forward.95 A quick glimpse of those 
facts explains that ruling. The plaintiff, Hostetler, worked at a Burger 
King.96 She alleged that a fellow supervisory employee at her restau-
rant grabbed her face one day at work and stuck his tongue down her 
throat.97 He repeated his effort to kiss her the next day.98 When she 
struggled to evade him, he began to unfasten her brassiere, managing 
to get four out of five snaps undone and threatening to “undo it all the 
way.”99 On another occasion while Hostetler was working, Payton an-
nounced that “he could perform oral sex on her so effectively that ‘[she] 
would do cartwheels.’”100 When Hostetler reported these incidents to 
her superiors, her district manager remarked that he dealt with his 
problems by getting rid of them.101 Days later, Hostetler—not Payton—
was transferred to a distant Burger King location.102 The district court 
thought that these incidents were not severe enough to amount to har-
assment and that Burger King had done enough, but the Seventh Cir-
cuit saw matters otherwise.103 It held that “the type of conduct at issue 
here falls on the actionable side of the line dividing abusive conduct 
from behavior that is merely vulgar or mildly offensive.”104 Although 
the court found it more difficult to say whether Payton’s behavior was 
so serious that it would allow a finder of fact to label Hostetler’s work 
environment hostile, since the number of incidents was not high, the 
court resolved that issue in Hostetler’s favor because the two principal 
acts were physical, rather than merely verbal.105 It is hard to say why 
Hostetler received a more favorable reception by the court, but perhaps 
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the physical dimension of the abuse she experienced made a difference. 
In any event, the court of appeals remanded the case to a district court 
for trial.106 
In Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,107 plaintiff Berry complained to her 
regional manager about incessant harassment from Causevic, her su-
pervisor at Delta Airline’s cargo facilities at Chicago’s O’Hare Air-
port.108 She asserted that Causevic had taken a substantial number of 
improper and harassing actions: he slid his hand up her shorts to her 
panty line and told her that he loved her smooth legs; he pulled her 
blouse away from her chest and tried to look down her shirt at her 
breasts; he repeatedly asked her if she would take him up on his “prop-
osition” (for sex) and if she would go with him on a “very, very long ride 
home”; he referred to her as his “girlfriend” in front of others; he asked 
her on a date; he told her that he thought her “butt” and legs were 
“sexy”; and he tried to touch or embrace her inappropriately on various 
occasions.109 Almost every time Berry sought help from Causevic at 
work, he would say things such as “give me a kiss first,” “what will you 
do for me,” or “only if you go on a long ride with me.”110 The district court 
granted summary judgment for Delta, and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed.111 It is worth quoting the holding: 
”[I]t is clear that the incidents of workplace “harassment” which 
occurred after Berry complained to [the regional manager] on 
June 7, 1999, while unfortunate, are not actionable as sexual 
harassment under Title VII (either collectively or individually) 
because Berry has presented no evidence suggesting that any of 
these incidents were motivated by her gender. Even taken in the 
light most favorable to Berry, the evidence presented suggests 
that all of the claimed instances of post-complaint harassment 
were meant as retaliation for Berry’s having complained about 
Causevic’s prior sexual harassment, and were not motivated by 
any anti-female animus.”112 
The court added that, insofar as the claimed harassment was mo-
tivated by Berry’s sex, Delta could not be liable because it did not know 
what was going on.113 
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The next example is a good-news, bad-news story: the case for lia-
bility went to a jury, which ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, but the case for 
punitive damages failed in the court of appeals. It is Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co.114 The legal 
question, which went all the way to the en banc court of appeals, related 
to whether evidence about a company’s obligations under its collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) was admissible to show the reasonable-
ness of its response to known (indeed, very well known) harassment.115 
The majority held that the company might be able to escape punitive 
damages based on its obligations under the CBA, and so it vacated the 
jury’s award of punitive damages and remanded for further proceed-
ings.116 
The underlying behavior was appalling. Gary Amos was a long-
time employee of Ameritech; he worked in its coin center and its small 
business unit.117 Most of his fellow employees were women.118 Unfortu-
nately for everyone, he could not seem to resist exposing himself at the 
workplace. The first glimpse of this behavior dated back to 1975 (and 
this was a 2002 decision!), when Barbara Huckeba complained to her 
supervisor that Amos had exposed himself to her three 
times.119 Ameritech’s response—shocking to modern eyes—was to fire 
Huckeba, not to discipline Amos. It justified that action by saying that 
Huckeba was more likely than Amos to find a good job elsewhere.120 And 
Huckeba was not alone in her complaints. Two other employees also 
complained in 1975 about sexually offensive conduct; they were luckier 
than Huckeba only insofar as they did not lose their jobs.121 But neither 
did Amos, who both kept his position and avoided discipline.122 The rec-
ord established other misconduct on Amos’s part in 1988, 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994. The list of misdeeds is a long one: “telling 
female co–workers that he was in love with them, flashing them, send-
ing notes with sexual messages or propositions, grabbing them and rub-
bing their hair or buttocks (sometimes with his hands, sometimes with 
his erect penis), and allowing himself to be seen masturbating at his 
desk.”123 
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Amos flashed someone in 1989 but was reprimanded only with a 
warning.124 The discipline escalated slightly in 1990, when five women 
informed Ameritech that Amos had pressed his erect penis against 
them.125 The company suspended Amos for two weeks. It did not choose 
a more severe sanction, it appears, because the responsible supervisor 
did not bother to read Amos’s personnel file and thus was unaware of 
his inglorious history.126 More complaints followed in 1991 and 1992, 
but they did not result in discipline.127 Other than admonitions to stop 
the offensive behavior,128 Amos ignored the advice. At long last, the 
company appeared to be on the brink of firing Amos: on December 18, 
1992, the equal employment opportunity coordinator recommended this 
action.129 But the coordinator had no power unilaterally to implement 
that recommendation.130 And the responsible person—the labor rela-
tions manager—was on vacation on December 18.131 He did not return 
and review the file until after the Christmas break. Critically more than 
30 days had elapsed since Amos’s most recent documented miscon-
duct.132 This was important because the CBA said that disciplinary 
measures had to be taken within 30 days of the misconduct.133 That 
meant, Ameritech said (and the en banc court accepted) that Ameritech 
had to wait for yet another incident before firing Amos.134 Not surpris-
ingly, more misconduct occurred in 1993 and early 1994, but Ameritech 
still did nothing. As the majority put it, “Another public-masturbation 
incident in March 1994 at last produced Amos’s removal.”135 This was 
enough in the unanimous view of the en banc court to support the jury’s 
verdict on liability for the EEOC; on that point, the court rejected 
Ameritech’s efforts to show why it should not be vicariously liable for 
Amos’s actions.136 The court split only on the question of punitive dam-
ages.137 
The majority held that even though the terms of the CBA could not 
help Ameritech on liability, that evidence was still relevant for punitive 
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damages.138 In order to win such damages, the court noted, the com-
plaining party (in this case, the EEOC) had to demonstrate that the 
respondent “engaged in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or 
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an ag-
grieved individual.”139 Ameritech, the court held, was entitled to try to 
persuade the district court that its decision to comply with the letter of 
the CBA did not “evince ‘malice’ or ‘reckless indifference’ to the federally 
protected rights of female employees.”140 The case was remanded for 
further proceedings on this point, though the court did note that a jury 
that was fully aware of the CBA and Ameritech’s explanation for its 
actions might still return the same $650,000 punitive damages 
award.141 Whether this case is a “good news” or a “bad news” story de-
pends on one’s viewpoint. From the negative perspective, it shows a 
company that repeatedly fails to follow through on the promise of its 
workplace conduct policies, to the great harm of its employees. And it 
seizes on the technicality of the CBA’s 30-day rule to take away the 
EEOC’s punitive damages verdict, despite the overwhelming evidence 
supporting that remedy. From the positive perspective, the EEOC won 
the case on liability and, to the extent that victory sent a message to 
companies not to tolerate this kind of egregious behavior, it may have 
helped victims of harassment well beyond the Ameritech employees in-
volved. 
Bilal v. Rotec Industries, Inc.142 provides the last example. Once 
again, a defense verdict on summary judgment was upheld by the court 
of appeals.143 The key holding was that the following incidents of har-
assment, spread over 14 months, were not sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to create an abusive work environment.144 Admittedly, the first few 
do not seem too bad in isolation. They include a statement from Chief 
Executive Officer Oury that plaintiff Bilal (a receptionist for the com-
pany) was a “fox,” and Oury’s invitation to Bilal to join him while watch-
ing the Chicago marathon.145 The remaining three are more trouble-
some. For example, Bilal alleged that Oury told her pointblank “that 
her job would be easier if she had sex with him.”146 On another occasion 
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he “walked behind her desk and rubbed his genitalia through his cloth-
ing against her arm.”147 In a third incident, Oury “took a piece of choc-
olate from his mouth and placed it in Bilal’s mouth while she was speak-
ing.”148 The court of appeals conceded that at least the chocolate 
incident deserved comment, but it said that “while bizarre and disgust-
ing, [this behavior] was ‘middle-of-the-continuum’ physical contact 
which, because it occurred in relative isolation, cannot be regarded as 
severe under the existing case law.”149 But perhaps the court’s most tell-
ing comment came earlier in the opinion, when it had this to say: 
[I]t is lamentable that what appears to have been a robust claim 
for hostile work environment was so significantly weakened by 
the inadequate response to the summary judgment motion of the 
defendants. However, we find no error in the district court’s lim-
itation of the analysis and thus proceed to review this claim in 
light of only the incidents plaintiff presented to the district 
court.150 
Bilal’s lawyer had failed to support her allegations with evidence 
admissible at the summary judgment stage, and her complaint failed to 
alert the company to the precise legal theories she was pursuing.151 She 
was left with nothing—not even a job, as the company fired her for al-
leged insubordination before she brought her Title VII case.152 Bilal 
thus shows that people can lose cases because of bad lawyering, just as 
they can lose them because of unfavorable legal rules. It can be hard, 
however, for a lawyer to know exactly what the court will demand at 
the summary judgment stage to show a genuine issue of material fact, 
especially in any case such as employment cases in which motivation or 
intent plays a major role. 
This anecdotal evidence (for that is all it is) from the Seventh Cir-
cuit is nonetheless enough to raise serious concerns about the effective-
ness of the legal system in addressing claims of sexual harassment in 
the workplace. There is a great problem of under-reporting, which leads 
to the problem that many cases never cross the threshold of a court-
house. For those that do, only some go to the federal courts, while others 
show up in state court as batteries, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, violations of state equal employment laws, and similar theo-
ries. And in the federal district courts, sexual harassment cases are, 
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like almost all other cases, frequently settled. The latter group leave 
very little in the way of footprints. Finally, even cases that are judicially 
resolved in the district courts often are not appealed. For the year end-
ing June 30, 2018, 277,000 civil cases were commenced in the district 
courts, but less than 28,000 civil appeals were commenced over the 
same period.153 On the other hand, it is interesting to see the cases that 
are appealed because they usually reach the court of appeals on an 
agreed factual record, and so they allow one to see which kinds of situ-
ations pass muster and which do not. 
That is why it is interesting (and manageable) to study the cases 
that reach the courts of appeals. Plaintiffs lose these cases for a variety 
of reasons, some of which are entirely legitimate. Those reasons include: 
 Failure to allege a violation of the law 
 Insufficient evidence to support allegations 
 Another non-merits factor, such as lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, failure to prosecute, etc., dooms the case 
 The employer should not be held liable because it responded 
appropriately or took appropriate preventive or remedial 
measures 
 The employer did not know about the bad behavior 
 The employer’s reasons for its action were not pretextual 
 The employee failed to take advantage of the employer’s 
workplace conduct policy 
 The employee did not complain in a timely way 
Studying the reasons why plaintiffs lose sheds some light on possi-
ble reforms, if the evidence of the widespread incidence of #MeToo prob-
lems points to systematic under-enforcement of the laws forbidding sex-
ual harassment, or if it reveals that those laws are too narrow or 
technical in their scope. A number of avenues are worth studying. First, 
the mechanisms for reporting harassment still need improvement. Vic-
tims fear that they will be seen as whiners, or worse, and that they may 
wind up with no job at all if they complain about a co-worker, or worse, 
a supervisor. Anti-retaliation policies can help in this respect, but they 
have not been as strong as they should be. Second, the inability to sue 
the offending person under federal law—or put differently, the need to 
tie all harassment directly to the employer—has hampered enforce-
ment. Particularly if one is concerned with fellow-employee harass-
ment, or harassment from a line supervisor who does not have the 
power to hire and fire, it may be both undesirable and difficult to tar 
the ultimate employer with misbehavior that very likely violates the 
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company’s written policies. Informal methods of dispute resolution that 
are available on a voluntary basis (i.e., not compulsory arbitration) have 
also proven to be trustworthy and helpful. Finally, a broader re-exami-
nation of what ought to be regarded as severe enough to constitute har-
assment, or pervasive enough, might reveal that even if courts no longer 
require literal hellishness, the bar may still be too high. 
This re-examination will succeed only if it takes all relevant per-
spectives into account. The courts must be fair arbiters attentive to the 
positions of all concerned—the victim, the alleged harasser, and the em-
ployer. There is much work to be done. But it is important to start from 
a realistic appraisal of the status quo. We can begin by jettisoning the 
myth that benign behavior is routinely condemned and getting to work 
on the serious issues. 
